Kant and the apriority of space

Philosophical Review 107 (2):179-224 (1998)
In interpretations of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" section of the first Critique, there is a widespread tendency to present Kant as establishing that the representation of space is a condition for individuating or distinguishing objects, and to claim that it is on this basis that Kant establishes the apriority of this representation. The aim of this paper is to criticize this way of interpreting the "Aesthetic," and to defend an alternative interpretation. On this alternative, questions about the formation of the representation of space figure more centrally, and the anti-Leibnizian character of Kant's argument can be properly appreciated.
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DOI 10.2307/2998483
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