David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 181 (3):375-394 (2011)
How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, but as a matrix of possibilities for pursuing and accomplishing one’s intentional actions, goals and projects. If this is correct, the links between planning, intention and perceptual experience are tight, while (contrary to some recent accounts invoking the notion of ‘sensorimotor expectations’) the links between embodied activity and perceptual experience, though real, are indirect. What matters is not bodily activity itself, but our practical knowledge (which need not be verbalized or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action. Such knowledge, selected, shaped and filtered by the grid of plans, goals, and intentions, plays, we argue, a constitutive role in explaining the content and character of visual perceptual experience.
|Keywords||Consciousness Sensorimotor models Action Perception|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michele Merritt (2015). Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.
Dave Ward (2015). Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
Kristina Musholt (2013). Self-Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.
Laura H. Malinin (2016). Creative Practices Embodied, Embedded, and Enacted in Architectural Settings: Toward an Ecological Model of Creativity. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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