Mind 108 (431):503 - 538 (1999)
|Abstract||There is as yet no settled consensus as to what makes a term a logical constant or even as to which terms should be recognized as having this status. This essay sets out and defends a rationale for identifying logical constants. I argue for a two-tiered approach to logical theory. First, a secure, core logical theory recognizes only a minimal set of constants needed for deductively systematizing scientific theories. Second, there are extended logical theories whose objectives are to systematize various pre-theoretic, modal intuitions. The latter theories may recognize a variety of additional constants as needed in order to formalize a given set of intuitions|
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