Philosophia 39 (1):179-200 (2011)
|Abstract||Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris|
|Keywords||Moral responsibility experimental philosophy Knobe Doris|
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