David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Clarendon Press (1997)
Mary Anne Warren explores a theoretical question which lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property--for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, Warren argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. She presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion, and the moral status of animals.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Buy the book||$26.17 used (48% off) $73.77 new Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Deckers (2009). Vegetarianism, Sentimental or Ethical? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (6):573-597.
Oscar Horta (2010). What is Speciesism? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
Orsolya Friedrich (2013). Knowledge of Partial Awareness in Disorders of Consciousness: Implications for Ethical Evaluations? Neuroethics 6 (1):13-23.
Amy Mullin (2011). Children and the Argument From 'Marginal' Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):291-305.
Julia Tanner (2013). Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
Similar books and articles
Richard Brook (2002). Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things:Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Ethics 112 (3):644-646.
Bart Gruzalski (2000). Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things:Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Ethics 110 (3):645-649.
Richard Joyce, Moral Status. Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, by Mary Anne Warren (Oxford University Press, 1997).
Robert P. Lovering (2004). Mary Anne Warren on “Full” Moral Status. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):509-530.
Paul Shapiro (2006). Moral Agency in Other Animals. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):357-373.
Andreas Frewer (1998). Warren, M.A.: 1998, Moral Status. Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1 (2):183-184.
David DeGrazia (2008). Moral Status as a Matter of Degree? Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
Luke Robinson (2011). Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
A. J. Mckay (1998). Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (5):354-355.
Carol W. Voeller (2001). Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Social Theory and Practice 27 (2):352-358.
Lisa Bortolotti (2007). Disputes Over Moral Status: Philosophy and Science in the Future of Bioethics. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 15 (2):153-8.
Aaron Simmons (2007). A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):267-278.
Christopher Wareham (2011). On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents. International Journal of Technoethics 2 (1):35-42.
Elizabeth Harman (2007). Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses: Can Loving or Worshipping Something Give It Moral Status? Philosophical Studies 133 (1):55 - 81.
Thaddeus Metz (2012). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.
Added to index2012-01-31
Total downloads17 ( #92,667 of 1,096,517 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #64,935 of 1,096,517 )
How can I increase my downloads?