David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403 - 426 (2009)
This paper argues that a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span>; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
|Keywords||a priori defeasibility epistemic possibility naturalism fallibilism epistemology of logic epistemic modals|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Laurence BonJour (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
W. V. Quine (1953/1980). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Warenski (2015). Deficiency Arguments Against Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Indefeasibility. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
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