David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426 (2009)
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori ; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
|Keywords||a priori defeasibility epistemic possibility naturalism fallibilism epistemology of logic epistemic modals|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Crispin Wright (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Warenski (2015). Deficiency Arguments Against Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Indefeasibility. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
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