On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents
International Journal of Technoethics 2 (1):35-42 (2011)
| Abstract | Artificial agents such as robots are performing increasingly significant ethical roles in society. As a result, there is a growing literature regarding their moral status with many suggesting it is justified to regard manufactured entities as having intrinsic moral worth. However, the question of whether artificial agents could have the high degree of moral status that is attributed to human persons has largely been neglected. To address this question, the author developed a respect-based account of the ethical criteria for the moral status of persons. From this account, the paper employs an empirical test that must be passed in order for artificial agents to be considered alongside persons as having the corresponding rights and duties. | |||||||||
| Keywords | artificial agents persons moral equality turing test moral turing test | |||||||||
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