David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 21 (4):497-515 (2011)
I consider whether there is a plausible conception of personal identity that can accommodate the ‘Multiplicity Thesis’ (MT), the thesis that some ways of creating and deploying multiple distinct online personae can bring about the existence of multiple persons where before there was only one. I argue that an influential Kantian line of thought, according to which a person is a unified locus of rational agency, is well placed to accommodate the thesis. I set out such a line of thought as developed by Carol Rovane, and consider the conditions that would have to be in place for the possibility identified by MT to be realised. Finally I briefly consider the prospects for MT according to neo-Lockean and animalist views of personhood.
|Keywords||Agency Animalism Dissociative identity disorder Internet addiction MMOGs Neo-Lockeanism Personal identity|
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Susan L. Hurley (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Kevin O'Regan (2012). How to Build a Robot That is Conscious and Feels. Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
Soraj Hongladarom (2013). Ubiquitous Computing, Empathy and the Self. AI and Society 28 (2):227-236.
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