David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Marcin Milkowski & Konrad Kalmont-Taminski (eds.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications (2010)
Broadly speaking, a naturalistic approach to epistemology seeks to explain human knowledge – and justification in particular – as a phenomenon in the natural world, in keeping with the tenets of naturalism. Naturalism is typically defined, in part, by a commitment to scientific method as the only legitimate means of attaining knowledge of the natural world. Naturalism is often thought to entail empiricism by virtue of this methodological commitment. However, scientific methods themselves may incorporate a priori elements, so empiricism does not follow from the methodological commitments of naturalism alone. And given a suitably-naturalistic conception of the a priori, a priori forms of justification may be compatible with naturalism generally. A priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism – and hence naturalistic epistemologies – if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of some of the inessential properties that have been associated with the concept. I argue that some of the more prominent strategies for accommodating normative notions within a naturalistic framework allow for the possibility of a priori justification. These include reliabilism, instrumental rationality, and (partial) nonfactualism about justification. A priori justification thus need not be seen as standing in opposition to all naturalistic epistemologies. It is only with nonnormative naturalistic epistemologies that a priori justification per se is incompatible, and this only because the notion of justification itself has no role to play within a nonnormative approach to epistemology.
|Keywords||naturalism normativity epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dan McArthur (2005). Normative Naturalism and the Relativised a Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):331 - 350.
Lisa Warenski (2009). Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403 - 426.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):299-317.
M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35 - 49.
Albert Casullo (2003). A Priori Justification. Oxford University Press.
Shane Oakley (2011). A Dilemma for Naturalized Epistemology? In Michael Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Open Court. 157.
Paul Tidman (1996). The Justification of a Priori Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):161-171.
Dan McArthur (2007). Laudan, Friedman and the Role of the A Priori in Science. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:169-190.
Darren Bradley (2011). Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):267-274.
Peter Markie (2000). Modest a Priori Knowledge and Justification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):179-189.
Derk Pereboom (1990). Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy. Synthese 85 (1):25 - 54.
Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira (2008). Methodological Naturalism and Epistemic Internalism. Synthese 163 (3):315 - 328.
Added to index2012-05-20
Total downloads8 ( #182,336 of 1,140,266 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #142,694 of 1,140,266 )
How can I increase my downloads?