A Gradable Approach to Dispositions

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68 - 75 (2007)
Abstract
Previous theories of the relationship between dispositions and conditionals are unable to account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees. We propose a fix for this problem which has the added benefit of avoiding the familiar problems of finks and masks
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