Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593 (2005)
|Abstract||Humeans hold that the nomological features of our world, including causal facts, are determined by the global distribution of fundamental properties. Since persistence presupposes causation, it follows that facts about personal identity are also globally determined. I argue that this is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the doctrine of Humean supervenience should therefore be rejected|
|Keywords||Causation Intrinsic Metaphysics Persistence Personal Identity Supervenience|
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