Humean supervenience and personal identity

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593 (2005)
Abstract
Humeans hold that the nomological features of our world, including causal facts, are determined by the global distribution of fundamental properties. Since persistence presupposes causation, it follows that facts about personal identity are also globally determined. I argue that this is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the doctrine of Humean supervenience should therefore be rejected
Keywords Causation  Intrinsic  Metaphysics  Persistence  Personal Identity  Supervenience
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):418-446.
David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
Theodore Sider (1997). Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.

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Citations of this work BETA
Katherine Hawley (2005). Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.
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Katherine Hawley (2005). Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.
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