Intentional action and the unintentional fallacy

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534 (2011)
Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01410.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Terence Rajivan Edward (2015). Unintentional Consent. Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):86-95.

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