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- G. D. Wassermann (1955). Some Comments on Methods and Statements in Parapsychology and Other Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):122-140.
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EVERYONE THINKS they are open-minded. Scientists in particular like to think they have open minds, but we know from psychology that this is just one of those attributes that people like to apply to themselves. We shouldn’t perhaps have to worry about it at all, except that parapsychology forces one to ask, "Do I believe in this, do I disbelieve in this, or do I have an open mind?".
Parapsychology, Philosophy and the Mind: A Festschrift in Honour of John Beloff’s 80th Birthday, ed. Fiona Steinkamp (McFarland Press, 2002).
The paper argues that there are effectively only two tenable theories of the mind?brain relationship: ?epiphenomenalism? and ?radical dualism? (interactionism). So long as account is taken only of the conventional sciences, the odds are heavily stacked in favour of epiphenomenalism. However, once the findings of parapsychology are admitted to consideration, a very different situation obtains. It is here argued that parapsychology only makes sense within a dualist metaphysic.
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