The argument from temporary intrinsics

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419 (2003)
The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
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DOI 10.1080/713659708
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Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Ryan Wasserman (2006). The Problem of Change. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):48–57.
Jack Spencer (2014). Relativity and Degrees of Relationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.

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