The argument from temporary intrinsics

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419 (2003)
Abstract
The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
M. Eddon (2010). Three Arguments From Temporary Intrinsics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619.
Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
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