The future similarity objection revisited

Synthese 150 (1):57 - 67 (2006)
David Lewis has long defended an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds. The purpose of this paper is to reevaluate Lewis’s response to one of the oldest and most familiar objections to this proposal, the future similarity objection.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118758
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2005). Chance and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):396–405.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Ryan Wasserman (2015). Lewis on Backward Causation. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):141-150.
Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.

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