A posteriori primitivism

Philosophical Studies 150 (1):123 - 137 (2010)
Recent criticisms of non-reductive accounts of color assume that the only arguments for such accounts are a priori arguments. I put forward a posteriori arguments for a non-reductive account of colors which avoids those criticisms.
Keywords Color  Primitivism  Alex Byrne  David Hilbert  Sydney Shoemaker
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DOI 10.2307/40783329
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Sydney Shoemaker (1998). Causal and Metaphysical Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):59–77.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hagit Benbaji (forthcoming). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

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