Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313 (2008)
| Abstract | Intentionalism holds that two experiences differ in their representational content if and only if they differ in phenomenal character. It is generally held that Intentionalism cannot allow for the possibility of spectrum inversion without systematic error, unless it abandons the idea that, for example, the qualitative character of color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of colors. The paper argues that the conjunction of all three -- the possibility of spectrum inversion, Intentionalism, and the inheritance thesis -- can be consistently, and plausibly, accepted | |||||||||
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