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Seeing red: The metaphysics of colours without the physics
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):33-52 (2005)
Abstract
By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of Sydney Shoemaker and Stephen Yablo, the paper offers a solutionAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Derivatives and Consciousness.David Builes - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):87-103.
Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities.Brian Cutter - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):38-52.
Panpsychism and the First-Person Perspective: The Case for Panpsychist Idealism.Brentyn Ramm - 2021 - Mind and Matter 19 (1):75-106.
Aesthetic Realism and Manifest Properties.Andrea Sauchelli - 2022 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 80 (2):201-213.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Causality and properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism.David R. Hilbert - 1987 - Csli Press.
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