David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (8):383-388 (2010)
Perceiving others? minds is a crucial component of social life. People do not, however, always ascribe minds to other people, and sometimes ascribe minds to non-people (e.g. God, gadgets). This article reviews when mind perception occurs, when it does not, and why mind perception is important. Causes of mind perception stem both from the perceiver and perceived, and include the need for social connection (perceiver) and a similarity to oneself (perceived). Mind perception also has profound consequences for both the perceiver and perceived. Ascribing mind confers an entity moral rights and also makes its actions meaningful. Understanding the causes and consequences of mind perception can explain when this most social of cognitive skills will be used, and why it matters.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Premack & G. Woodruff (1978). Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
R. L. Buckner & D. C. Carroll (2007). Self-Projection and the Brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):49-57.
Joshua Knobe (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
Citations of this work BETA
Aiyana K. Willard & Ara Norenzayan (2013). Cognitive Biases Explain Religious Belief, Paranormal Belief, and Belief in Life's Purpose. Cognition 129 (2):379-391.
Ara Norenzayan & Will M. Gervais (2013). The Origins of Religious Disbelief. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):20-25.
Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). When Ignorance is No Excuse: Different Roles for Intent Across Moral Domains. Cognition 120 (2):202-214.
Konika Banerjee & Paul Bloom (2014). Why Did This Happen to Me? Religious Believers’ and Non-Believers’ Teleological Reasoning About Life Events. Cognition 133 (1):277-303.
Elisa Järnefelt, Caitlin F. Canfield & Deborah Kelemen (2015). The Divided Mind of a Disbeliever: Intuitive Beliefs About Nature as Purposefully Created Among Different Groups of Non-Religious Adults. Cognition 140:72-88.
Similar books and articles
Katsunori Miyahara (2011). Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
Peiyuan Meng (2010). A Further Analysis of Zhu Xi's Theory of Mind. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (3):377-395.
N. Gangopadhyay & L. Schilbach (2011). Seeing Minds: A Neurophilosophical Investigation of the Role of Perception-Action Coupling in Social Perception. Social Neuroscience.
Leon Pearl (1963). Four Philosophical Problems: God, Freedom, Mind, and Perception. New York, Harper & Row.
Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger (2013). Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Bill Brewer (1998). Experience and Reason in Perception. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 203-227.
Norton Nelkin (1996). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Norton Nelkin (1997). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Mind and Language 12 (2):178–180.
Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Charles M. Myers (1962). Perceptual Events, States, and Processes. Philosophy of Science 29 (July):285-291.
Added to index2011-06-11
Total downloads12 ( #205,927 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #84,767 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?