Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency

Analysis 67 (295):223–230 (2007)
Abstract
A number of recent accounts of our first-person knowledge of our attitudes give a central role to transparency - our capacity to answer the question of whether we have an attitude by answering the question of whether to have it. In this paper I raise a problem for such accounts, by showing that there are clear cases of first-person knowledge of attitudes which are not transparent.
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Daniel Watts (2013). Kierkegaard and the Search for Self‐Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525-549.
Julie Germein (2012). Two Objections to Moran's Transparency Account. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.
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