The Normativity of Rationality

Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068 (2010)
Abstract
This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise if we reject the wide-scope solution
Keywords Rational Requirements
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bruno Guindon (2016). Sources, Reasons, and Requirements. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
Jan Willem Wieland (2013). What Carroll's Tortoise Actually Proves. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):983-997.

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