David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068 (2010)
This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise if we reject the wide-scope solution.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Willem Wieland (2013). What Carroll's Tortoise Actually Proves. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):983-997.
Similar books and articles
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
Nicholas Southwood (2008). Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality. Ethics 119 (1):9-30.
Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
Andrew Reisner (2009). Unifying the Requirements of Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
John Brunero (2012). Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
Julian Fink (2014). A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'. Erkenntnis (4):1-33.
John Broome (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope? Mind 116 (462):359-370.
John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Julian Fink (2010). Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
John Brunero (2010). The Scope of Rational Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
Andrew Reisner (2011). Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Errol Lord (2011). Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
Added to index2010-10-26
Total downloads218 ( #2,336 of 1,102,737 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #13,147 of 1,102,737 )
How can I increase my downloads?