Value and reasons to favour

This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.
Keywords value  reasons  buck-passing  fitting-attitude
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John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
Alex Gregory (2014). A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
Shyam Nair (2014). A Fault Line in Ethical Theory. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):173-200.

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Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
Matt King (2012). Moral Responsibility and Merit. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2).

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