David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):215-229 (2009)
A debate has simmered concerning the nature of clinical reasoning, especially diagnostic reasoning: Is it a “science” or an “art”? The trend since the seventeenth century has been to regard medical reasoning as scientific reasoning, and the most advanced clinical reasoning is the most scientific. However, in recent years, several scholars have argued that clinical reasoning is clearly not “science” reasoning, but is in fact a species of narratival or hermeneutical reasoning. The study reviews this dispute, and argues that in a theoretical sense, the dispute rests upon a naïve—but very popular—caricature of what constitutes “science reasoning.” But, if the dispute rests upon just such a caricature, why is it so persistent? The study concludes by suggesting that we, as patients and as physicians, have deep psychological tendencies that incline us to adopt the very naïve “science” concept/model of diagnostic reasoning, even if (or when) we understand its inaptness.
|Keywords||Clinical reasoning Clinical science Narrative Hermeneutics|
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References found in this work BETA
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (2009). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press 112.
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Kathryn Montgomery (2006). How Doctors Think: Clinical Judgment and the Practice of Medicine. Oxford University Press.
Fredrik Svenaeus (2000). The Hermeneutics of Medicine and the Phenomenology of Health: Steps Towards a Philosophy of Medical Practice. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephen G. Henry (2010). Polanyi's Tacit Knowing and the Relevance of Epistemology to Clinical Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):292-297.
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