Brutal Composition
Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249 (1998)
| Abstract | According to standard, pre-philosophical intuitions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts - wheels, handlebars, molecules, atoms, etc. Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself with questions about the nature of composition.1 The main question that has been raised about composition is, roughly, this: Under what circumstances do some things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? It turns out that it is surprisingly difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this question that accords with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects. In fact, the three rival views in response to this question that have received the most support in the literature are (i) that there are no objects composed of two or more parts (which means that there are no stars, chairs, humans, or bicycles);2 (ii) that the only objects composed of two or more parts are living organisms (which still means no stars | |||||||||
| Keywords | Special Composition Question Brutal compositoin restricted composition Universalism Nihilism | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
 Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesNed Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249.
Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249.
Ned Markosian (1998). Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.
Nikk Effingham (2011). Undermining Motivations for Universalism. Noûs 45 (4):696-713.
Ned Markosian (2008). Restricted Composition. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub..
Ross P. Cameron (2012). Composition as Identity Doesn't Settle the Special Composition Question1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):531-554.
Sara Rachel Chant (2006). The Special Composition Question in Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.
Paul Silva (2012). Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):69-88.
Uriah Kriegel (2008). Composition as a Secondary Quality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.
Ned Markosian (forthcoming). A Spatial Approach to Mereology. In Shieva Keinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press.
Trenton Merricks (2005). Composition and Vagueness. Mind 114 (455):615-637.
Kris McDaniel (2010). Composition as Identity Does Not Entail Universalism. Erkenntnis 73 (1):97-100.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-11-20Total downloads124 ( #4,078 of 556,915 )Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #4,192 of 556,915 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
