Conditionals and indexical relativism

Synthese 166 (2):333-357 (2009)
I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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DOI 10.2307/40271145
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

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Citations of this work BETA
Brian Weatherson (2008). Attitudes and Relativism. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):527-544.

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