Conditionals and indexical relativism

Synthese 166 (2):333-357 (2009)
Abstract
I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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    References found in this work BETA
    Herman Cappelen (2008). Content Relativism and Semantic Blindness. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 265-86.
    Iris Einheuser (2008). Three Forms of Truth-Relativism. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 187-203.

    View all 24 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Crispin Wright (2008). Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.

    View all 7 citations

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