David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Peter Walley argues that a vague credal state need not be representable by a set of probability functions that could represent precise credal states, because he believes that the members of the representor set need not be countably additive. I argue that the states he defends are in a way incoherent.
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