Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper is part of a larger campaign against moderation in foundational epistemology. I think the only plausible responses to a kind of Humean sceptic are, radical responses. The Humean sceptic I have in mind tells us about a sceptical scenario, ss, where our evidence is just as it actually is, but some purported piece of knowledge of ours is false. The sceptic names the proposition You aren’t in ss as s, and calls on us to respond to the following argument.|
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