Indicatives and Subjunctives

Philosophical Quarterly 51:200--216 (2001)
Abstract
This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, those resources will be brought to bear on the logic of conditionals
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Citations of this work BETA
Toby Handfield (2004). Counterlegals and Necessary Laws. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):402 - 419.
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