Intrinsic properties and combinatorial principles

Abstract
Three objections have recently been levelled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00110.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Theodore Sider (2001). Maximality and Intrinsic Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
Dan Marshall (2013). Intrinsicality and Grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-19.
Ben Caplan (2011). Ontological Superpluralism. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):79-114.

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