Intrinsic properties and combinatorial principles
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):365-380 (2001)
| Abstract | Three objections have recently been levelled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesTheodore Sider (1996). Intrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):1 - 27.
Rae Langton (1998). Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford University Press.
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
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