True, truer, truest
Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):47-70 (2005)
| Abstract | What the world needs now is another theory of vagueness. Not because the old theories are useless. Quite the contrary, the old theories provide many of the materials we need to construct the truest theory of vagueness ever seen. The theory shall be similar in motivation to supervaluationism, but more akin to many-valued theories in conceptualisation. What I take from the many-valued theories is the idea that some sentences can be truer than others. But I say very different things to the ordering over sentences this relation generates. I say it is not a linear ordering, so it cannot be represented by the real numbers. I also argue that since there is higher-order vagueness, any mapping between sentences and mathematical objects is bound to be inappropriate. This is no cause for regret; we can say all we want to say by using the comparative truer than without mapping it onto some mathematical objects. From supervaluationism I take the idea that we can keep classical logic without keeping the familiar bivalent semantics for classical logic. But my preservation of classical logic is more comprehensive than is normally permitted by supervaluationism, for I preserve classical inference rules as well as classical sequents. And I do this without relying on the concept of acceptable precisifications as an unexplained explainer. The world does not need another guide to varieties of theories of vagueness, especially since Timothy Williamson (1994) and Rosanna Keefe (2000) have already provided quite good guides. I assume throughout familiarity with popular theories of vagueness. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesD. Goldstick & B. O'Neill (1988). Truer. Philosophy of Science 55 (4):583-597.
Pablo Cobreros (2011). Supervaluationism and Classical Logic. In Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Hans-Christian Schmitz & Uli Sauerland (eds.), Vagueness in Communication, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6517. Springer.
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