David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80 (1996)
In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of propositional attitudes in order to provide a naturalistic account of their use. I argue that a closer examination of the analogy implies rather than avoids the existence of structured representations constituting a language of thought, and thus that it should be abandoned by those who wish to avoid the postulation of such internal representations
|Keywords||Folk Psychology Mind Proposition Science|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
M. J. Cresswell (1985). Structured Meanings. MIT Press.
David Pickles, William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamson (1992). Connectionism and the Mind: An Introduction to Parallel Processing in Networks. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):101.
Ned Block (ed.) (1981). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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