|Abstract||Our primary interest this week will be in two objections Jackson mentions which seem to threaten his program. Each of them is avoided by appeal to the two-dimensional framework we sketched last week. Before we go over that framework again, we will start by looking at the objections. For reasons that may become apparent shortly, we will look at them in reverse order. So first we’ll look at this objection from Chapter 3, an objection which turns on the discovery of a posteriori necessities by Kripke and Putnam.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Hagit Benbaji (2008). Two-Dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement. Acta Analytica 23 (1):55-67.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). On the Modal Content of A Posteriori Necessities. Theoria 75 (4):344-357.
Philip Pettit (2004). Descriptivism, Rigidified and Anchored. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):323-338.
David J. Chalmers (2006). The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press.
B. R. Rees (1955). The Ten-Day Week: Fresh Papyrological Evidence. The Classical Review 5 (02):143-.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #35,279 of 548,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?