Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
|Abstract||According to an attractive account of belief, our beliefs have centered content. According to an attractive account of communication, we utter sentences to express our beliefs and share them with each other. However, the two accounts are in conflict. We have to either change our understanding of belief or modify our theory of communication. In this paper, I explore the consequences of holding on to the claim that beliefs have centered content. If we do in fact express the centered content of our beliefs, the content of the belief the hearer acquires cannot in general be identical to the content the speaker expresses. I sketch an alternative account of communication, the Recentering model, that accepts this consequence and explains how the expressed and the acquired content are related.|
|Keywords||Centered Content Indexicals Communication Utterance Content Belief Content Lewis Stalnaker|
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