Doing without representation: Coping with Dreyfus

Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):82-88 (2002)
Hubert Dreyfus argues that the traditional and currently dominant conception of an action, as an event initiated or governed by a mental representation of a possible state of affairs that the agent is trying to realise, is inadequate. If Dreyfus is right, then we need a new conception of action. I argue, however, that the considerations that Dreyfus adduces show only that an action need not be initiated or governed by a conceptual representation, but since a representation need not be conceptually structured, do not show that we need a conception of action that does not involve representation.
Keywords Action  Doing  Ethics  Representation  Dreyfus, H
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DOI 10.1080/10002002018538723
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John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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