Graduate studies at Western
Studia Logica 94 (1):87 - 104 (2010)
|Abstract||The naive set theory problem is to begin with a full comprehension axiom, and to find a logic strong enough to prove theorems, but weak enough not to prove everything. This paper considers the sub-problem of expressing extensional identity and the subset relation in paraconsistent, relevant solutions, in light of a recent proposal from Beall, Brady, Hazen, Priest and Restall . The main result is that the proposal, in the context of an independently motivated formalization of naive set theory, leads to triviality.|
|Keywords||Naive set theory paraconsistency relevant logic restricted quantification|
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