Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 35 (June):156-78 (1968)
|Abstract||The metamathematical theorems of Gödel and Church are frequently applied to the philosophy of mind, typically as rational evidence against mechanism. Using methods of Post and Smullyan, these results are presented as purely mathematical theorems and various such applications are discussed critically. In particular, J. Lucas's use of Gödel's theorem to distinguish between conscious and unconscious beings is refuted, while more generally, attempts to extract philosophy from metamathematics are shown to involve only dramatizations of the constructivity problem in foundations. More specifically, philosophical extrapolations from metamathematics are shown to involve premature extensions of Church's thesis|
|Keywords||Logic Mathematics Metaphysics Mind Lucas, J|
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