Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy 84 (2):233-250 (2009)
|Abstract||The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures classed as sexual. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege some sexual desires, activities, or pleasures as paradigmatic. Since the phenomenal quality unifying the sexual domain is not itself morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The view that participant consent is morally sufficient in the sexual domain therefore requires the more controversial view that it is morally sufficient in our lives in general.|
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