Small brains and minimalist emulation: When is an internal model no longer a model?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):421-422 (2004)
Many of Grush's arguments should apply equally to animals with small brains, for which the capacity to internally model the body and environment must be limited. The dilemma may be solved by making only very approximate predictions, or only attempting to derive a “high-level” prediction from “high-level” output. At the extreme, in either case, the “emulation” step becomes trivial.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X04480091
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