History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 28:595-610 (2006)
|Abstract||I present a reconstruction of F.H.C. Crick's two 1957 hypotheses "Sequence Hypothesis" and "Central Dogma" in terms of a contemporary philosophical theory of causation. Analyzing in particular the experimental evidence that Crick cited, I argue that these hypotheses can be understood as claims about the actual difference-making cause in protein synthesis. As these hypotheses are only true if restricted to certain nucleic acids in certain organisms, I then examine the concept of causal specificity and its potential to counter claims about causal parity of DNA and other cellular components. I first show that causal specificity is a special kind of invariance under interventions, namely invariance of generalizations that range over finite sets of discrete variables. Then, I show that this notion allows the articulation of a middle ground in the debate over causal parity.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Predrag Sustar (2007). Crick's Notion of Genetic Information and the ‘Central Dogma’ of Molecular Biology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):13-24.
Predrag Šustar (2007). Crick's Notion of Genetic Information and the 'Central Dogma' of Molecular Biology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):13 - 24.
Daniel Murray Hausman (2005). Causal Relata: Tokens, Types, or Variables? Erkenntnis 63 (1):33 - 54.
James Woodward (2010). Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318.
E. M. (1999). The Prion Challenge to the `Central Dogma' of Molecular Biology, 1965-1991 - Part I: Prelude to Prions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 30 (1):1-19.
Nancy Cartwright (2002). Against Modularity, the Causal Markov Condition, and Any Link Between the Two: Comments on Hausman and Woodward. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):411-453.
Nancy Cartwright (2003). Two Theorems on Invariance and Causality. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):203-224.
Mark Day & George S. Botterill (2008). Contrast, Inference and Scientific Realism. Synthese 160 (2):249 - 267.
Jani Raerinne (2011). Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology. Acta Biotheoretica 59 (3):251-271.
Alex Broadbent (2011). Inferring Causation in Epidemiology: Mechanisms, Black Boxes, and Contrasts. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
Rebekah Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
G. Ramsey (forthcoming). Organisms, Traits, and Population Subdivisions: Two Arguments Against the Causal Conception of Fitness? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
PF Snowdon (2011). Perceptual Concepts as Non-Causal Concepts. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2012-08-18
Total downloads13 ( #87,887 of 549,070 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #5,415 of 549,070 )
How can I increase my downloads?