Putnam, Reference and Essentialism

Dialogue 25 (3):509- (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In Putnam's theory of reference, an historical component and an indexical one both play some part in establishing the extension of terms, although in “The meaning of ‘meaning’” it is not altogether clear just how important he believes the historical element to be. He seems to be much more interested in its indexical component, which he believes plays more or less the same role in his theory as rigidity does in Krip-ke's. In this paper, I will look more closely at these two elements and see what sorts of roles they could play in a theory like Putnam's. A theory of the extensions of general terms will emerge which differs from Putnam's in some important respects. It does, however, have some similarity with a recently published theory of Matthen's, but the arguments are different. I will also outline a theory of essences and kinds, which is based on this modified version.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Putnam's Way to Essentialism.Wen-Fang Wang - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:111-117.
Natural Kinds: (Thick) Essentialism or Promiscuous Realism?Nigel Leary - 2007 - Philosophical Writings 34 (1):5 - 13.
Putnam's traditional neo-essentialism.Neil E. Williams - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):151 - 170.
OK or OK*—Putnam’s Way to Essentialism.Weng-Fang Wang - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:237-250.
Thomas Kuhn's misunderstood relation to Kripke-Putnam essentialism.Rupert Read & Wes Sharrock - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):151-158.
Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:313-345.
Is essentialism unscientific?Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):493-510.
Fixing the reference of theoretical terms.Robert Nola - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):505-531.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-25

Downloads
16 (#855,572)

6 months
3 (#902,269)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Singular terms.Michael Devitt - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (7):183-205.
Locke versus Aristotle on natural kinds.Michael Ayers - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (5):247-272.

Add more references