David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 36 (4):375-380 (1969)
In Chapter 4 of  Grünbaum sets out to refute Einstein's philosophy of physical geometry. The latter's theory is seen as lying within the tradition of "anti-empiricist conventionalism" of Duhem and Quine as opposed to the "qualified empiricism" of Poincaré, Carnap and Reichenbach. Consequently Grünbaum sets the stage for his critique of Einstein by discussing certain of the views of these other thinkers. But in these preliminary discussions the various theses are confused and misrepresented in such a way as to make it almost impossible to evaluate Grünbaum's final treatment of Einstein's thesis. For this reason I will deal only with those parts of this chapter in which the roots of Grünbaum's confusion are to be found. This will involve analyses of two theories which are not clearly distinguished by Grünbaum. The first is Duhem's denial of the "crucial experiment" in physics; the second is Quine's version of "pragmatism."
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
James H. Fetzer (1974). Grünbaum's 'Defense' of the Symmetry Thesis. Philosophical Studies 25 (3):173 - 187.
Hugh M. Lacey (1968). The Causal Theory of Time: A Critique of Grünbaum's Version. Philosophy of Science 35 (4):332-354.
Gerald J. Massey (1969). Toward a Clarification of Grünbaum's Conception of an Intrinsic Metric. Philosophy of Science 36 (4):331-345.
Philip L. Quinn (1969). The Status of the D-Thesis. Philosophy of Science 36 (4):381-399.
Don Howard (1990). Einstein and Duhem. Synthese 83 (3):363-384.
F. Weinert (1995). The Duhem-Quine Thesis Revisited. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):147 – 156.
Adolf Grünbaum (1960). The Duhemian Argument. Philosophy of Science 27 (1):75-87.
Adolf Grünbaum (1962). The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial? A Contemporary Evaluation of the Duhem-Quine Thesis. Synthese 14 (1):17 - 34.
Arthur B. Millman (1990). Falsification and Grünbaum's Duhemian Theses. Synthese 82 (1):23 - 52.
Robert Barrett (1969). On the Conclusive Falsification of Scientific Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 36 (4):363-374.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads199 ( #14,491 of 1,793,064 )
Recent downloads (6 months)71 ( #9,350 of 1,793,064 )
How can I increase my downloads?