Negation and Quantification in Aristotle

History and Philosophy of Logic 11 (2):131-150 (1990)
Two main claims are defended. The first is that negative categorical statements are not to be accorded existential import insofar as they figure in the square of opposition. Against Kneale and others, it is argued that Aristotle formulates his o statements, for example, precisely to avoid existential commitment. This frees Aristotle's square from a recent charge of inconsistency. The second claim is that the logic proper provides much thinner evidence than has been supposed for what appears to be the received view, that is, for the view that insofar as they occur in syllogistic negative categoricals have existential import. At most there is a single piece of evidence in favor of the view?a special case of echthesis or the setting out of a case in proof
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DOI 10.1080/01445349008837163
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References found in this work BETA
Benson Mates (1972). Elementary Logic. New York,Oxford University Press.
Arthur N. Prior (1962). Formal Logic. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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