David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press (2010)
Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it turns out in the end that this problem is not really a special problem about moral disagreement at all: it is a general problem about disagreement as such. For this reason, in the later sections of this essay, I shall turn to some general questions in epistemology, about the epistemic significance of disagreement.
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Citations of this work BETA
David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
Brian Besong (2014). Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement. Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
Cory Davia & Michele Palmira (2015). Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.
Gurpreet Rattan (2014). Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.
Mark Hanin (2012). Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp's Account. Res Publica 18 (4):283-301.
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