David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426 (2004)
According to normative judgment internalism (NJI), normative judgments -- that is, judgments of the form 'I ought to F' and the like -- are "essentially practical", in the sense that they are in some way essentially connected to practical reasoning, or to motivation for action. Many metaethicists believe that if NJI is true, then it would cast grave doubts on any robustly realist (RR) conception of normative judgments. These metaethicists are mistaken. This mistake about the relations between NJI and RR seems to be due to hasty and undefended assumptions about the nature of belief. Any philosophical conception of belief that has the resources to deal with Frege's Puzzle (how to explain the apparent failures of referential transparency in belief ascriptions) will also have the resources to reconcile NJI and RR with respect to normative judgments.
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References found in this work BETA
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
John Henry McDowell (1998). Mind, Value, and Reality. Harvard University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Greenberg (2009). Moral Concepts and Motivation. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):137-164.
Elinor Mason (2008). An Argument Against Motivational Internalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
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