David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2009)
Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) But what exactly does this claim mean? And what reason is there for believing it? In this paper, I shall first try to clarify the content of the claim that the intentional is normative. Then I shall examine a number of the arguments that philosophers have advanced for this claim (and for the parallel claim that meaning is normative). As we shall see, many of these arguments are unsuccessful. However, I shall close by giving a sketch of what may be a successful argument for this claim.
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Citations of this work BETA
Lei Zhong (2015). Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). Against Essential Mental Normativity Again. Dialogue 50 (02):333-346.
Anandi Hattiangadi (2010). The Love of Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Rescuing Doxastic Normativism. Theoria 78 (4):293-308.
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