David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (2007)
This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what ought to be the case true. The third part is about the epistemology of normative beliefs: how we could ever know, or even have rational or justified belief in, propositions about what ought to be the case
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$34.30 new (21% off) $36.39 used (16% off) $42.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1458.3.W43 2007|
|ISBN(s)||0199251312 9780199251315 0199568197 9780199568192|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Gideon Rosen (2015). Real Definition. Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189-209.
Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Justified Inference. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
Caj Strandberg (2015). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
Ralph Wedgwood (2015). The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.
Similar books and articles
Krist Vaesen (2006). How Norms in Technology Ought to Be Interpreted. Techne 10 (1):117-133.
Joseph Raz (2010). Reason, Reasons and Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. OUP Oxford
Andrew Reisner (2011). Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press
David Copp (1995). Morality, Normativity, and Society. Oxford University Press.
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Adolf Rami (2005). Über Die Sogenannte Normativität der Bedeutung. Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):81-117.
Stephen Finlay (2010). Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press 57-85.
Chase Wrenn (2004). Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads213 ( #13,275 of 1,907,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #35,829 of 1,907,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?