David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 34 (3):400-421 (2000)
Nonreductive physicalism faces a serious objection: physicalism entails the existence of an enormous number of modal facts--specifically, facts about exactly which physical properties necessitate each mental property; and, it seems, if mental properties are irreducible, these modal facts cannot all be satisfactorily explained. The only answer to this objection is to claim that the explanations of these modal facts are themselves contingent. This claim requires rejecting "S5" as the appropriate logic for metaphysical modality. Finally, it is argued that rejecting "S5" is not too high a price to pay for nonreductive physicalism: "S5" should probably be rejected anyway
|Keywords||Logic Mental Property Modality Physicalism Supervenience Truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ausonio Marras (2007). Kim's Supervenience Argument and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 66 (3):305 - 327.
Warren Shrader (2008). On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):257-271.
Robert Kirk (1996). Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.
Peter Forrest (1996). Physicalism and Classical Theism. Faith and Philosophy 13 (2):179-200.
Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Gardner (2005). Supervenience Physicalism: Meeting the Demands of Determination and Explanation. Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208.
Andrew Melnyk (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #33,185 of 1,012,724 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,884 of 1,012,724 )
How can I increase my downloads?