In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Many philosophers have claimed that “belief aims at the truth”. But is there any interpretation of this claim on which it counts as true? According to some philosophers, the best interpretation of the claim takes it as the normative thesis that belief is subject to a truth-norm. The goal of this essay is to clarify this normative interpretation of the claim. First, the claim can be developed so that it applies to partial beliefs as well as to flat-out full beliefs. Secondly, an answer is given to the objection that has been raised against the claim that belief is subject to a truth-norm of this sort by Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi; responding to this objection will involve careful reflection on the structure of normative concepts, and of how these normative concepts apply to belief.|
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