The Right Thing to Believe

In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
Many philosophers have claimed that “belief aims at the truth”. But is there any interpretation of this claim on which it counts as true? According to some philosophers, the best interpretation of the claim takes it as the normative thesis that belief is subject to a truth-norm. The goal of this essay is to clarify this normative interpretation of the claim. First, the claim can be developed so that it applies to partial beliefs as well as to flat-out full beliefs. Secondly, an answer is given to the objection that has been raised against the claim that belief is subject to a truth-norm of this sort by Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi; responding to this objection will involve careful reflection on the structure of normative concepts, and of how these normative concepts apply to belief.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):267-97.
Conor Mchugh (2012). The Truth Norm of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.
Ralph Wedgwood (2009). The Normativity of the Intentional. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Raleigh (2013). Belief Norms & Blindspots. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.
Ralph Wedgwood (2006). How We Know What Ought to Be. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.
Peter Milne (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Huw Price (2010). Truth as Convenient Friction. In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press. 167--190.
Ralph Wedgwood (2007). Normativism Defended. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 85--102.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-09-12

Total downloads

73 ( #19,464 of 1,102,731 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #18,253 of 1,102,731 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.