Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. 201--229 (2003)
Abstract
Let us take an example that Bernard Williams (1981: 102) made famous. Suppose that you want a gin and tonic, and you believe that the stuff in front of you is gin. In fact, however, the stuff is not gin but petrol. So if you drink the stuff (even mixed with tonic), it will be decidedly unpleasant, to say the least. Should you choose to drink the stuff or not?
Keywords Practical reason  Rational Choice  Reasons for action  Constructivism  Korsgaard, Christine M.  Velleman, J. David
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