Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160 (2008)
|Abstract||After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism -- numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience) -- we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed|
|Keywords||Descartes dualism materialism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Marleen Rozemond (1993). The Role of the Intellect in Descartes's Case for the Incorporeity of the Mind. In Stephen Voss (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes.
Suzette M. Evans (1981). Separable Souls: A Defense of Minimal Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):313-332.
Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008). Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
Gordon P. Baker (2002). Decartes' Dualism. Routledge.
Grant Duncan (2000). Mind-Body Dualism and the Biopsychosocial Model of Pain: What Did Descartes Really Say? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (4):485 – 513.
Charles Taliaferro (1986). A Modal Argument for Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):95-108.
John A. Foster (1989). A Defense of Dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
Marleen Rozemond (2007). Descartes’s Dualism. In Janet Broughton & John Carriero (eds.), A Companion to Descartes. Blackwell.
Michael Pelczar (2008). Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #8,896 of 739,318 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #13,419 of 739,318 )
How can I increase my downloads?